Tracking Lone Wolf Terrorists by Bates, Rodger A.
The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology 
Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 6 
March 2016 
Tracking Lone Wolf Terrorists 
Rodger A. Bates 
Clayton State University, rodgerbates@clayton.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jpps 
Recommended Citation 
Bates, Rodger A. (2016) "Tracking Lone Wolf Terrorists," The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology: 
Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/jpps/vol8/iss1/6 
This Refereed Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Public and Professional Sociology by an authorized editor of 







     As a social construct, terrorism takes place within specific historical and social 
contexts (Schmid, 1992).  Terrorism is a politically motivated form of premeditated 
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets. As a complex phenomenon, 
numerous attempts have been made to differentiate terrorism based upon the kinds of 
goals pursued, the types of acts manifested, the motivations for these acts, the levels of 
organizational hierarchy encountered and the social and psychological profiles of 
participants (Bates, 2011, 2012). 
     
      Terrorism is associated with a structural environment characterized by an imbalance 
of power between different ideological groups (Black, 2004).  In the tradition of the 19th 
century Russian anarchist group, the People’s Will, it is propaganda by deed (White, 
2014). Also, it is a tactic that morphs as terrorist groups evolve and change (Lesser, 
1999). As a strategy and tactic, terrorism may include bombing, hijacking, arson, 
kidnapping, or hostage taking – all of which can be enhanced by force multipliers like 
transnational support, technology, media coverage and ideological and/or religious 
extremism (Jenkins, 1983). These force multipliers have contributed to the rise of 
terrorism as a major threat in the last half of the 20th and early 21st centuries. 
     
     Modern terrorism has taken many forms.  It has been an important strategy in the 
wars of independence by many former colonies and emerging nations. The Chinese 
and Cuban revolutions, Vietnam War, and the many conflicts in South America, the 
Middle East, and Southwest Asia were marked by numerous acts of terrorism by all 
participants.  Increasingly, world news is rife with reports of terrorist groups known by an 
escalating number of alphabet-challenging letters who use terrorism as a means to 
promote their causes, challenge their enemies and intimidate populations. 
      
     Terrorists can be differentiated in terms of their objectives and organizational 
structure.  The U.S. Army (2007) describes terrorist groups as separatist, ethnocentric, 
nationalist and revolutionary. They also can be characterized in terms of organization 
and structure (Bates, 2011).  Today, groups such as al Qaeda, ISIS (DAESH), Hamas, 
Hezbollah and other groups employ terrorism as a tactic. They deploy units or 
individuals to carry out directed or inspired attacks.  As such, however, they are 
vulnerable to detection and interdiction.  The intelligence and related agencies in the 
United States and abroad have increasingly been successful in identifying, tracking, and 
in a number of cases eliminating or significantly degrading these groups (Maras, 2013). 
      
     The extensive efforts to identify and track today’s terrorists, however, have 
contributed to the growth of another form of terrorism which is much more difficult to 
identify, track and counter.  Self-radicalized, lone wolf terrorists are the response by 
groups to promote and recruit individuals and motivate them to action while operating 
beyond the awareness and response of the increasingly more effective agents of 
counterterrorism (Bates, 2012).  
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The Lone Wolf Threat 
     The rise of lone wolf terrorism has created an increasing dilemma in today’s security 
environment. With more effective counterterrorism practices, leaderless resistance has 
emerged as one of the most difficult forms of terrorism to anticipate and counter. Most 
recently, lone wolf terrorism has been associated with right-wing reactionaries and 
religiously radicalized Islamic jihadists (Bates, 2012).   
       
     Lone wolf terrorism involves self-radicalized individuals who commit violent acts to 
promote a cause or support a belief system. These acts, or propaganda by deeds, are 
extremely difficult to counter because they appear to be isolated and avoid many of the 
traditional organizational characteristics used to identify and track traditional terrorist 
groups.  Though usually not capable of large-scale attacks, the modern lone wolf 
terrorist has access to a range of weapons with greater capacities for terror-inspiring 
events. However, the power of the lone wolf terrorist is not necessarily the actual level 
of harm potentially experienced, but the level of intimidation that the threat of such 
random acts of violence can exert on a community.   
 
   Today’s media has played a major role in providing visibility so that others can be 
motivated and follow the lead of previous successful lone wolf attacks (Matusitz, 2015). 
Osama bin Laden, in the 2003 jihadist Internet forum “Sada Jihad,” urged his followers 
to take action without waiting for instructions (Baker and deGraaf, 2010).  Likewise, al 
Qaeda leader Abu Jihad al Masri promoted lone wolf terrorism in ‘How to Fight Alone 
(Clemons, 2010).  Recently, ISIS called upon its followers around the world to pick up a 
knife, gun or any weapon and become personal warriors for the cause (Love & Yan, 
2014). 
 
     The research on lone wolf terrorism has dramatically increased in the past decade.  
In February 2010, both the director of the FBI and the director of the CIA stated that 
lone wolf terrorism was a major concern of their agencies (Sage, 2011). Typologies 
suggest that these terrorists may range from reactionary rightwing individuals, 
opponents of abortion, environmental or animal rights advocates, hate group members, 
or advocates of radical Islam like al Qaeda and ISIS. 
    
      In a single dimensional typology, Phillips and Pohl (2011) identify two-types of lone 
wolf terrorists: risk aversion and risk seeking.  Looking at types of justification, Lisa 
Andrews (2001) identifies lone wolf terrorists in terms of moral justification, religious 
conviction, social change orientation, level of political antagonism, commitment to 
revenge, desire for attention, and importance of symbolism.  In addition, Artiga (2011) 
suggests that lone wolves are trying to send a message or promote an ideological 
position, raise awareness for a cause, shape the political process, spread fear, defame 
a major social institution, or correct a major injustice.  Others note that lone wolves may 
be motivated by ideological, social, psychological, monetary, threats, or greed. 
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     Multidimensional typologies of lone wolf terrorists include White’s (2012) Tactical 
Typology of Terrorism with its emphasis on the type of activity (criminal/political), the 
level of terrorist activity, and the form of response by control agents.  Likewise, 
Pantucci’s (2011) “A Typology of Lone Wolves: A Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist 
Terrorists” focuses on the means and contexts of self-radicalization, tactics of 
engagement, and the framework of available support. The loner, the lone wolf, the lone 
wolf pack and the lone attacker have been popular categories of Islamist terrorists.  In 
addition, Bates’ (2012) General Model of Lone Wolf Terrorism is a four dimensional 
(Rubik’s Cube) perspective which looks at the influence of the extent of involvement in 
the radicalization process (self/group), type of motivation (altruistic/egoistic), form 
(chaos/career), and risk management (aversion/taking).  
 
Identifying Lone Wolf Terrorists   
    These more complex perspectives have allowed scholars and security agencies to 
identify possible combinations of types and to better understand the social, 
psychological, and structural components that create environments conducive to the 
emergence of lone wolf terrorism.  With over 60 U. S. cases prosecuted in 2015 and 
900 investigations in all 50 states, we can better understand the level of threat as well 
as the backgrounds and characteristics of these terrorists (Bergen, 2016). 
     
      Identifying terrorists in general, and lone wolf terrorists in particular, is difficult. 
Almost fifty years ago Hacker (1976) and others attempted to profile terrorists.  They 
suggested that terrorists were young, unmarried, middle class males with some 
university training and with an understanding or affinity for left-wing political philosophy, 
which was considered at the core of the terrorist actions of the day (Russell and Miller, 
1983).  However, these generalizations did not facilitate any useful strategies of 
identification.  Attempts at psychological profiling by Stevens (2005) and McCaulley and 
Moscalenko (2014) offered some interesting insights but little basis for practical 
intelligence.  Specifically, Staub (2002) found that terrorists were linked to three types of 
social groups: those identifying with a suffering group; those who respond to suffering in 
their own group; and alienated individuals who find purpose in joining a terrorist group.  
Likewise, McCaulley and Moscalenko stated that terrorists may manifest personality 
types represented by revolutionaries drawn to a cause, those who try a variety of 
revolutionary or terrorist causes, those who have had a sudden conversion experience, 
and those who find acceptance in a committed peer group (White, 2014).  On the other 
hand, Laqueur (1999), Pape ( 2003) and Borum (2004) suggested that as terrorism 
changes over time, the profile changes.  Interestingly, Horgun (2009) wrote that as a 
complex phenomenon, identifying the roots of terrorism is not as fruitful as identifying 
the routes. 
      
     With the rise of leaderless resistance and interest in the radicalization process, 
identifying lone wolf terrorists has emerged as a prominent concern. Specifically, violent 
radicalization, alienation and self-estrangement have been identified as social-
psychological precursors to terrorism (Jenkins, 2009; White, 2014).  These processes 
focus on interpretations of reality in which individuals perceive that their existence is 
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threatened by powerful, evil and depraved forces, thus freeing them from normative 
restraints. 
 
     Gill, Horgan and Deckart (2014) analyzed the socio-demographic characteristics of 
119 convicted lone-actor terrorists in the United States and Europe, focusing on 
ideological commitment and network support structures.  They categorized lone-actors 
in terms of gender, age of first terrorist act, relations status and family characteristics, 
education, employment history/status, military experience, ideological justifications, 
awareness of intentions, pre-event behaviors, degree of perceived social isolation, 
behavior within a wider network, and links to a wider network.  The results of their 
analysis suggested seven significant findings:  (1) no uniform profile; (2) prior to the 
events, others knew of their radicalization and intent to act; (3) a significant range of 
events or actions preceded their attacks; (4) many but not all were socially isolated; (5) 
there was involvement with like-minded others; (6) their actions were not sudden or 
impulsive; (7) despite the diversity of lone-actor terrorists, there were distinguishable 
differences between subgroups.  Their findings indicated the importance of focusing on 
behavior rather than only on semi-stable (at best) socio-demographic characteristics. 
    Hamm and Spaaj (2015) developed one of the most comprehensive databases on 
domestic lone wolf terrorists.  They suggested that, in terms of lethality, lone wolf 
terrorism is not on the rise in the U.S., but the targets are increasingly police and 
military personnel and the use of firearms is now the preferred tactic.  Though they 
found no standard profile, many are unemployed, single white males with criminal 
records and are prone to mental illness.  Their research supports previous studies that 
radicalization is associated with a combination of personal and political grievances 
which have formed the basis for an affinity with other online sympathizers.  A triggering 
event is usually associated with some public statement, blog, post or manifesto.  
Unfortunately, much of the data upon which this study was based included domestic, 
right wing or special interest causes.  It did not include the growing number of jihadist- 
inspired acts.  
     Historically, the roots of terrorism are most often found in the socio-economic, 
political and/or religious fabric of society.  Addressing the perceived inequalities 
between majority and minority populations is the logical strategy in minimizing or 
eliminating the causes of asymmetric conflict in general and the specific instances of 
lone wolf terrorism.  However, in a multi-cultural world with extensive boundaries 
between diverse groups, addressing these roots of conflict is challenging. Because of 
these conditions, identifying potential terrorists in general and lone wolf terrorists in 
particular is very difficult.  Social scientists have, as we have seen, attempted to 
develop psychological and social profiles, but they have not been specific enough to 
facilitate the tracking and control of these threat agents.  Therefore, the routes to 
terrorism have been suggested as a more useful strategy. These more complex 
perspectives have allowed scholars and security agencies to identify possible 
combinations of types and to better understand the social, psychological, and structural 
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components that create environments conducive to the emergence of lone wolf 
terrorists and to identify and track them. 
Tracking Terrorists     
      Unlike military units, terrorist groups are hard to track.  A terrorist’s affiliation may be 
to non-state entities, and often they operate with or without the knowledge of any official 
authority.  Their anonymity and mobility may mask the origins or specific locations of 
their infrastructures or even bases of operation.  In such situations, there are limited 
political channels that a government can apply to lessen the threat of many terrorist 
groups (Strickland, 2014).  Also, in some countries governmental authority isn't strong 
enough to crack down on terrorist groups, and in others governments may share similar 
beliefs and philosophies with these groups. These governments might not put forth 
much effort to end terrorist activity. When governments are unable to gather 
international support to pressure another government to end hostile activities, there are 
few political channels to curtail terrorism. 
      
     Extensive efforts have been directed to understand the terrorism process, including 
studies of motivation, recruitment, retention, and structurally conducive social, 
economic, political and religious environments (Bates, 2011).  Strategies and tactics for 
identifying and tracking terrorists have been developed by counterterrorism agencies 
using psychological profiling, forensic accounting, communication intercepts, social 
media monitoring, biometrics and a number of other classified techniques (Lichtblau and 
Risen, 2006).  Early in the war on terrorism the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
(TFTP), with its links to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT), provided significant information for the identification and 
arrest of a number of terrorists operating in the U.S.  However, concerns raised by the 
release of the Snowden documents over the legality of extensive data mining by the 
NSA, FBI, CIA and the U.S. Treasury Department resulted in a number of international 
treaties and more restrictive regulations.  This reduced access to forensic accounting 
information (TFTP, 2014). Likewise, the development of the Terrorist Identities Datamart 
Environment (TIDE, 2014), with 680,0000 to a million subjects on the government watch 
list as well as over 860,000 biometric files, reflects the extensive resources brought to 
bear by counterterrorism agencies. 
      
     Communication monitoring and intercepts have been successful in limiting the ability 
of terrorist groups to plan and coordinate their activities. The National Security Agency 
(NSA, 2016) is the primary U.S. agency responsible for cryptology and Signals 
Intelligence (SIGNT) and Information Assurance (IA) products and services.  Using 
sophisticated monitoring technology (classified), the NSA provides world-wide access to 
electronic communications.  Though restricted by federal law against domestic 
monitoring, other federal and state agencies, with restrictions, have been able to 
provide valuable intelligence related to terrorist threats within the U.S.   
     
     Concerns about personal privacy and the legality of domestic communication 
monitoring have given rise to the growth of commercial encryption software, which has 
helped terrorists avoid detection.  Though counterterrorism agencies have invested in 
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enormous programs to automatically collect and analyze electronic communications, the 
growing sophistication of terrorists has contributed to an ongoing electronic struggle for 
data access and security (Scheiner, 2013).  Nevertheless, the NSA has access to a 
huge amount of data, especially through the communication trunks that move Internet 
data.  If it cannot get access through agreements with telecommunication companies, it 
has been suggested (Snowden) that the NSA surreptitiously monitors communication 
channels by tapping undersea cables, intercepting satellite communications, and other 
data sources.  Through its ability to quickly sift large amounts of meta-data, it can 
identify the sources of communications, its content, and the individuals involved. 
     
     Open source intelligence activities, like monitoring magazines, newspapers, radio 
and television broadcasts, are another important tool to track terrorists.  Many terrorist 
organizations provide valuable information about themselves in their public 
communications and propaganda campaigns (Prunckun, 2015).  Al Qaeda’s broadcasts 
and publications have provided significant information on the goals and objectives of the 
group.  While also mobilizing and communicating with actual and potential terrorists, the 
digital crumbs associated with the dissemination of magazines, such as INSPIRE and Al 
SHAMIKA, provide access to the potential identity and location of those who appear to 
at least be interested in their cause (Bates and Mooney, 2014). 
     
     The Internet has become a crucial tool for global terrorism (Matusitz, 2015).  Their 
web sites number over 7,000, and terrorists have been successful in hacking other sites 
to post propaganda videos. In a process called steganography, they also embed 
messages within text or videos (Lau, 2003).  Nevertheless, the NSA and other federal 
agencies have developed effective counter measures to thwart electronic encryption 
and covert communications channels (Branch, Armitage and Branch, 2007).   
 
        The Dark Web also has become a source of terrorist activity.  Using the onion.link 
router and software such as TOR, terrorists raise funds via bitcoin and put up mirrored 
sites to support sites regularly deleted on the World-Wide Web.  As Cox (2015) noted, 
terrorists have used the Dark Web to post propaganda videos like the documentary, 
The Flames of War, and to rally jihadists in the Balkan countries.  However, as verified 
in the Snowden leaks, the NSA is using a program known as XKeyscore, which 
automatically identifies anyone attempting to download TOR.  Though this program 
identifies individuals using TOR, it does not capture what they are accessing on the 
Dark Web.  Former Department of Homeland Security Directors Michael Chertoff and 
Toby Smith (2015) believe that law enforcement and other security agencies should 
monitor TOR users and sites.  In particular, they recommend mapping the hidden 
service directory, customer data monitoring, social site monitoring, hidden service 
monitoring and marketplace profiling. 
     Terrorist activities on the Dark Web and the Visible Web are not only monitored by 
governmental security agencies, but they are also viewed by private citizens concerned 
about terrorism and potential hate crimes. Groups of researchers, hackers, and 
maverick computer geeks, who cyber-stalk terrorist networks, are now active in both the 
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United States and abroad.  Aaron Weisburd, founder of Internet Haganah and director 
of the Society for Internet Research, works out of his Carbondale, Illinois home and 
describes his organization as a "global non-governmental ad-hoc intelligence network" 
modeled after al Qaeda's very own network. His organization has assisted in shutting 
down numerous sites linked to networks affiliated with groups such as Hezbollah, 
Hamas, al Qaeda and ISIS (Rosenblatt, 2007). 
     
      Terrorist groups like the Islamic Cyber Caliphate Army have responded by 
developing hackers who have attacked government, commercial, and private web sites.  
They have hacked sites, uploaded propaganda, and released personal and confidential 
information about military, police and government officials.  With posts on both the 
Visible and Dark webs, these cyber terrorists have encouraged lone wolf attacks on 
identified individuals and their families (SIG, 2016).   Recently, they also targeted a 
number of world leaders and even Weisburd and his group. 
      
     The struggle between terrorists and counterterrorism agencies also takes place 
within the environment of social media.  Terrorists, and in particular lone wolf terrorists, 
often seek affirmation or opportunities to promote their radical perspectives through 
social media sites.  Carmon and Stalinsky (2015) suggest that American companies like 
Twitter, FaceBook, Google, Apple, Microsoft, YouTube, WhatApp, Skype, Tumblr and 
Instagram have served as propaganda vehicles for global jihadists.  Through graphic 
beheadings and other executions, ISIS has gained attention and recognition as the new 
leader in global jihad. The power of social media, as reflected in the Arab Spring, has 
been a significant force multiplier in the world of terrorism.  Not only groups of terrorists, 
but also single actors are mobilized, directed or at least inspired through the constant 
flow of posts, tweets and other forms of social media. 
      
     Just as advertisers and marketing specialists have learned to monitor and mine 
social media for commercial purposes, so too have security agencies.  Using false 
identities, called “sock puppets,” social media can be used to identify, track and 
manipulate participants (Prunckun, 2015).  Online fake agents, employing sophisticated 
computer-generated algorithms based on narrative and statistical probabilities, 
penetrate radical forums and disseminate false information. 
     
      Along with profiling, forensic accounting, communication monitoring, and Internet 
and social media scrutiny, terrorist tracking also involves other covert techniques.  At 
the international level, satellites and drones identify and track groups and individual 
terrorists and locate training camps and related infrastructure.  Recently, the U.S. 
military and special operation entities have begun using miniature satellites known as 
Cubesats to track specific terrorist targets (Klotz, 2014). Even private citizens have 
contributed to tracking activities through Google Earth technology (Noak, 2014).  The 
military also has been using drone technology to track and interdict terrorists in current 
combat zones.  Likewise, drones are now being used for border security in the U.S. and 
for immigration and homeland security purposes (Gunderson, 2015). 
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      Human intelligence (HUMINT) also continues to play a vital role in the identification 
and tracking of terrorists.  Clandestine and covert operatives provide vital and specific 
information on terrorist activities.  The use of informants and agents to gather 
information is, however, a high risk activity.  Therefore, specifics on this form of terrorist 
tracking will not be presented.  However, community-based surveillance programs, such 
as Community Oriented Policing (COP) like the Green Bay Way, illustrate the many 
benefits of embedded neighborhood policing.  COP often encourages information on 
criminal and possible terrorist radicalization.  The similar strategy of Mosaic 
Engagement, found in the United Kingdom’s Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy 
(Prevent), is another example of engaging local communities to identify radicalization 
and terrorism (Southers, 2013). 
 
Tracking Lone Wolf Terrorists 
     While identifying potential lone wolf terrorists is difficult, tracking them is even more 
so.  Part of that difficulty is that they may be associated with a variety of causes and 
groups.  Today, the threat of inspired or directed radical Islamic jihadist terrorism 
dominates the news.  The major attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Ft. Hood, San 
Bernardino, Orlando and other sites, both foreign and domestic, have focused our 
attention on this group.  However, numerous other domestic terror threats have been 
associated with a variety of other groups.  The FBI has tracked white supremacist 
groups like the KKK, Aryan Nation and related hate groups.  Single-issue groups like 
the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and anti-abortion groups 
also have spawned lone wolf terrorist attacks.  The Southern Poverty Law Center tracks 
148 “patriot groups” which include anti-tax and anti-government organizations, various 
militia groups, and the Sovereign Citizens, all of which have been associated with 
violence and lone wolf attacks (Somashekhar and Leonnig, 2015). However, law 
enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security face practical, legal and political 
challenges when investigating and tracking these domestic groups. 
 
     The increasing threats from radical Islamic terrorist groups and their advocates have 
gained national attention.  As Bergen (2016) notes, self-radicalized lone wolf attackers 
in the U.S. are a greater threat than returning ISIS fighters from Syria and Iraq, but 
finding them remains difficult since they do not fit any ethnic profile and the only thing in 
common is their connection to social media. On the other hand, Weiman (2015) 
suggests that the lone wolf label may be a detriment to addressing this problem.  The 
belief that terrorists of this type act alone is incorrect; they are inspired or directed by 
others.  Wolves do not hunt alone; they hunt in packs.  In this instance, a virtual wolf 
pack inspires or directs these acts. Lone wolves are often recruited, trained and directed 
by others online.  They use the Internet to find everything from instructions on how to 
make a bomb, diagrams of public buildings, and names of police, government and 
military to target.  YouTube videos and Twitter postings provide inspiration, direction 
and personal contacts with other jihadists and also fighters in Iraq and Syria.  In 2015, 








     In their study of 119 lone actor terrorists, Gill, Horgan and Deckart (2014) found that 
they regularly engaged in detectable and observable activities with a wide range of 
individuals, social movements, or terrorist organizations.  Using the Internet, YouTube, 
Twitter or similar forms of social media, these individuals have posted manifestos, 
diatribes or pleas calling for violence, and, in their minds, justifiable acts against others.  
Thus, one of the first steps to identify and track potential lone wolf terrorists is to monitor 
these sites. 
 
     Whereas al Qaeda is an elitist radical Islamic terror group, ISIS is a populist group 
and uses the Internet to open its ranks to almost anyone willing to further their goals.  
Their form of lone wolf terrorism encourages ex-post-facto declarations of identification 
with the movement.  This provides greater security and anonymity for self-radicalized 
jihadists and minimizes their prior identification and tracking.  However, even the most 
independent attacks involve some prior public or virtual commitment.  For this reason, 
friends, relatives and the public are critical in countering terrorists, in the same way as 
law enforcement deals with single-shooters. 
 
     Gill, Horgan and Deckart (2014) also found that lone-actor terrorist events were 
rarely sudden and impulsive.  Evidence of some form of virtual or hands-on training as 
well as strategic or tactical planning was associated with most attacks.  This planning 
and acquisition of skills, weapons and/or other related resources provide for the 
discovery of lone wolf terrorists.  Obviously, travel to a terrorist training facility, either 
domestic or abroad, is a trackable activity.  The acquisition of weapons or bomb-making 
supplies provides additional evidence of an impending terrorist action.  The Boston 
Marathon bombers accessed INSPIRE magazine to make a pressure cooker-based 
explosive device.  They also purchased fireworks for the black powder to build the 
bombs (Weiman, 2015).  Timothy McVeigh followed the Anarchist’s Cook Book’s recipe 
to make the fertilizer fuel oil-based explosive (ANFO) used in the Oklahoma City 
bombing (Fire, 1995). Because of their potential danger, people purchasing quantities 
must provide personal documentation.  However, the attacks in Paris and Brussels 
involved the explosive TATP (triacetone-triperoxide), also called the “Mother of Satan” 
because of its instability, which is available in nail polish remover and hydrogen 
peroxide found in most homes.  Nevertheless, geospatial analysis of these precursors 
may prove useful to track potential terrorists (Smith, et. al., 2005). 
 
     As previously noted, it is difficult to profile lone wolf terrorists.  However, despite their 
diversity, researchers have noted distinguishable differences between subgroups.  
Compared to right wing and single-issue lone wolves, those inspired by radical Islamic 
groups (al Qaeda, ISIS, Boko Haram) are generally younger, are often students and are 
likely to have sought legitimation from epistemic authority figures.  They are more likely 
to have been radicalized and trained through virtual sources.  Right wing lone wolves, 
on the other hand, are usually unemployed, less educated, have made verbal 
statements to friends and families about their intent or beliefs, and have engaged in dry 
runs or have obtained assistance from others in procuring weapons (Gill, Horgan and 
Deckart, 2014).   
 
9
Bates: Tracking Lone Wolf Terrorists
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2016
10 
 
     Created by Congress in 2003, the Department of Homeland Security’s mission 
includes preventing terrorism and enhancing security; managing our borders; 
administering immigration laws; securing cyberspace; and ensuring disaster resilience 
(DHS, 2016). The DHS is committed to operating a multifaceted team of 22 government 
agencies and organizations to stop terrorism before it occurs. These agencies include 
the Secret Service, the Border Patrol, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the 
Coast Guard and other agencies responsible for transportation security and port 
security, plus a number of intelligence organizations.  Because of its size, the 
complexity of the agencies involved, and the diversity of some of their missions, 
coordination and cooperation have been problematic (White, 2014).  
 
     The FBI allocates billions of dollars to support counterterrorism efforts (Strickland, 
2014).  The National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) coordinates these efforts, including 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) of over 4,000 members nationwide from 500 
state and local agencies and 55 federal agencies.  The JTTF provides a one-stop 
source for information, including the terror watch list, which enables a shared 
intelligence base across many agencies.  However, because lone wolf terrorism in the 
U.S. is a national issue, many of the government agencies such as the NSA and CIA 
are restricted from operating domestically.  Though the Patriot Act has expanded the 
powers of our domestic intelligence agencies like the FBI, the clash over civil liberties 
has limited the tools and tactics of counterterrorism within the U.S.  
 
     As a domestic issue, lone wolf terrorism is a major responsibility of state and local 
law enforcement agencies.  Using JTTF information and undercover or cyber operations 
by the FBI, local agencies investigate, track and respond to domestic threats.  A variety 
of law enforcement agencies like the Law Enforcement Information Network, the 
National Crime Information Center, and the fusion centers around the country provide 
important information to local law enforcement (White, 2014).  Thus far, state and local 
law enforcement has been reasonably successful – with the help of the above agencies. 
However, the anonymity and mobility of potential lone wolf terrorists still poses a 
significant challenge. 
 
A Potential Response 
     Enhanced communication and intelligence sharing is necessary between external 
and internal homeland security agencies and state and local law enforcement. Since 
lone wolf terrorism is, for the most part, an internal security threat at the community 
level, local law enforcement must identify, track, and interdict them. To do this, they 
must move beyond their traditional roles and include more attention, training and 
intelligence gathering to counterterrorism. 
 
    Through federal grants, many local agencies have upgraded their tools and tactics to 
deal with terrorist threats, but most are focused on response.  SWAT team training, 
increased firepower and special assault-style vehicles will help, but it takes enhanced 
intelligence and investigative capabilities to deter local terrorist activities. For example, 
720 municipal law enforcement agencies that integrate community policing with the new 
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mandates from the DHS have increased their counterterrorism preparedness – and 
have also lowered their local crime rates (Adcox, 2014). 
 
    Local agencies can access federal counterterrorism information. The terror watch list 
is available, including the FBI Terrorist Screening Center’s password-protected App 
(application) via a smart phone.  The Digital Terror + Hate App from the Simon 
Weisenthahl Center lists information on jihadists, white supremacists, anti-Semitic and 
other hate groups. While the federal government has extensive resources to track 
terrorists, most local agencies may have one or two individuals, at best, who deal with 
digital surveillance.  These Apps can help. The website addresses and social media 
accounts of locals who run solo hate campaigns provide a geographic search function 
to identify the sources and support networks of lone wolf terrorists (Koebler, 2015). 
 
     Local communities can prioritize the types of terrorist threats because of increased 
access to relevant terrorist-related intelligence. Given a community’s demographics, the 
patterns of social media content observed, and the types of groups or individuals 
identified by federal or regional agencies, police can improve their focus on potential 
threats.  Some communities are more likely to be a source of jihadist radicalization, yet 
others may have a higher risk of anti-government or white supremacist activities. Police 
auxiliary officers, with adequate cyber training, can provide intelligence information 
pertinent to local threats just as Weisburd ‘s Society for Internet Research (Greenberg 
and Cooper, 1996). 
 
    Most lone wolf terrorists engage in some prior acts. Frequenting known hate groups 
or mosques with extremist reputations may be an additional part of the mosaic of 
radicalization. Local police could make routine checks to find buyers of large amounts of 
fertilizer or similar components for improvised explosives, with special attention to locals 
on the terror watch list. They could also monitor local concealed carry permit 
applications, especially for those who were turned down. Local gun shows could be 
monitored for those purchasing weapons from private sellers, which bypasses the 
federal firearms background check requirement (Bates, 2015). Local law enforcement 
could work with area gun stores to identify individuals who did not pass the required 
background check or who appear suspicious (Cutway, 2016). 
     
     Enhanced community engagement activities by local police also can provide a more 
conducive environment for counterterrorism awareness.  If local police have sufficient 
diversity in their staff, they may be better able to make and maintain contacts in the 
community. If little diversity is present, local police may seek community support to 
create outreach opportunities.  A ministerial alliance, including leaders of local mosques 
or similar religious groups, can improve community solidarity.  It also might identify 
those groups that avoid interaction or cooperation with others. 
 
     Tracking lone wolf terrorists in a local community is difficult. Limited resources and 
legal restraints are significant impediments.  A balance must be maintained to avoid the 
alienation of individuals.  However, improved coordination between federal and local 
11
Bates: Tracking Lone Wolf Terrorists
Published by DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University, 2016
12 
 
agencies, combined with the use of open-source data and increased community 
engagement can foster the identification and tracking of potential lone wolf threats. 
 
Conclusions 
     As the threat of domestic and international terrorism increases, the identification and 
tracking of terrorists is the most important component of counterterrorism.  Given the 
diversity of the sources of terrorism, each threat is associated with different structural 
environments and potential participants.  Profiling terrorists is very difficult.  However, 
focusing on the routes to terrorism has allowed us to better understand the recruitment, 
radicalization, and related activities associated with terrorism in general and lone wolf 
terrorism in particular.  Digital crumbs left as they become radicalized and move from 
spectator to potential threat provide clues for their identification.  At the international and 
national levels, forensic accounting, the monitoring of the Internet and the Dark Web, 
and the use of undercover cyber operatives play important roles in effective 
counterterrorism. Local law enforcement can use the information developed by other 
agencies and can provide community awareness and local engagement to address the 
threat of lone wolf terrorists. The most important element remains the vigilance and 
involvement of citizens and even family members.  While lone wolf terrorists are hard to 
identify and track, learning more about their routes and behaviors gives us the tools and 
tactics for more effective counterterrorism. 
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